Zooming in on China
As the intern of e2 in the autumn of 2009, Päivi Kuusela wrote a series of texts on China. She holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences degree and has specialized in Chinese language, culture and politics. She was born and raised in Taiwan and consequently retains "insider" knowledge on the Chinese way of mind.
In the texts Päivi wrote for e2, she presents viewpoints on Chinese think tank activity, Chinese modernisation as well as China´s role in the field of global politics. She also discusses the relation between democracy and Chinese capitalism. In the texts, *W**hat does China think?* (2008) by Mark Leonard is a key source of reference.
I happily recommend the reading of Päivi´s texts from this link.
Karina Jutila
Highlights from Mark Leonard’s book
What Does China Think? (Harper Collins Publishers, 2008)
“…I remember noticing how—all of sudden—almost every global challenge had acquired a Chinese dimension: from African development to the reform of the United Nations system, the Doha global trade talks to the Iranian nuclear programme, genocide in Darfur to oil prices in Venezuela…I suddenly knew that without understanding China, it would be impossible to understand world politics (7-8).”
- Mark Leonard, Executive Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Structuring China’s Internal Debates
For three years, Mark Leonard met with contemporary Chinese thinkers, among them representatives of both the government as well as think tanks, in order to chart current internal Chinese discussions. He records this venture in What Does China Think? (Harper Collins, 2008). China has become an essential element in global politics and this book provides valuable insight into the structure of the debates going on within the country. Although the book raises more questions than it answers, for the student of Chinese modernity and its historical development, it functions as a textbook-of sorts, a rudimentary navigational text that can help chart the course for future analysis of Chinese internal debates and the question of China’s rise. After providing brief analysis of Chinese internal debates in relation to both domestic and foreign policy, this paper will proceed to highlight two central themes for the reader to follow in the future. One relates more to Chinese domestic policy while the other to foreign policy. These themes are those of the nature of a new Chinese modernity and Chinese participation in international multilateral fora; both themes are , more specifically speaking, concerned with a more in-depth understanding of Chinese interpretation of concepts, which are based on the internal debates. The question of whether China is becoming more Western, is not the right question. Instead we should investigate the Chinese interpretations of concepts.
This analysis is set in the larger framework of understanding the future development of China and is generally critical of the trend of a `Chinese capitalism with no democracy´, although a more in-depth analysis of this trend is beyond the scope of this review.
Structuring Internal Domestic Debate:Should the market or the citizen be at the centre of reform?
Before the Tiananmen incidents of 1989, political and economic liberalism had been seen, by the Chinese reformist intellectuals, as a seamless whole, benefiting all Chinese people. But after 1989, these intellectuals split into two camps. The `New Right´ came to regard free markets as the most important goal and were willing to accomodate political authoritarianism, while the `New Left´ emphasized political equality and political democracy. The `New Left´ advocated a degree of market reforms, but not total market freedom.
For Zhang Weiying, an economic liberal or member of the `New Right´, “the planned economy is the foundation of political despotism”, Leonard documents. The state is to, in this perspective, hold a minimum role, and only then can the foundations for democratic politics be laid. The `New Left´ differs in their view as to the role of the state, and it is this point of contention that will be highlighted in this short analysis. The perspective taken will largely be that of Wang Hui, because this serves the scope of the starting question of inquiry best, that is, “How to avoid Chinese capitalism without democracy”? This is because the `New Left´, although they do support a degree of market reform, worry about inequality. This was also the worry of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, as evidenced in the modernisation program he created to suit the needs of China in the beginning of the 1900s.
Wang Hui sees a resemblance between the Tiananmen protests and the fight against neo-liberalism, the anti-globalization protests in Seattle and Genoa. He came to question the justice of unregulated free markets and became convinced that, in preventing inequality, the state had a role to play. According to him, there were two separete stories at Tiananmen: 1)one group wanted social welfare and protection from the market and 2)the other group wanted democracy and protection from the huge Communist state.
The `New Left´ advocates a gentler form of capitalism than those on the `New Right´. Actually, it is a Chinese variant of social democracy which they are calling for, with a strong state, tax revenue of which would be used to enhance equality. For years, Deng Xiaoping´s prioritization of market reforms, as exemplified in his saying `it doesn´t matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches the mice´, the economy has been the first priority. The above quote reflects the `growth-at-all-costs incentive structure for local officials´, Leonard writes. For example, a situation of havoc has ensued as local officials pursue their own self-interest, as to get rich is an end in itself. For the `New Left´, the bad fruit has been repression and massive environmental degradation. China has not been called `the dictatorship of the economists´ without reason. The economy itself, in the words of Wang Hui, actually `acquired the force of an ethics´.
For the ´New Left´, the color of the cat does matter, that is, ideology does matter. Citizens matter. At the time of the writing of the book, the Chinese citizens are feeling insecure, with no guarantee of social welfare. As a result they are consuming less and saving more. The argument is that the Chinese citizens will not begin to feel less insecure until the state begins to provide them with more of a social safety net. Only then will they begin spending more, benefiting the Chinese economy as one of its challenges is how to increase domestic spending. And so, it is highly interesting to note that as the development of the Chinese welfare system becomes a key factor in boosting Chinese economic performance, the result is the central government´s commitment to building a Chinese welfare state. These are possible developments where “the citizen is at the center”.
Structuring the Internal Debates on Foreign Policy
With keen awareness of taking the risk of over-simplification: if the debates on domestic policy can be structured to the `New Left´ and `New Right´ , then the debates relating to foreign policy could be classified into debates by the `liberal internationalists´, `Neo-comms´and the `Pragmatists´. Chapter three is entitled “Comprehensive National Power”, a theme that reflects both the Chinese leniency towards being comprehensive in matters as well as the fact that this comprehensive national power has become a `national obsession´ , according to Leonard. He goes on to note, however, that the more power China accumulates, the more cautious it becomes in flaunting it.
By 2008 the `Peaceful Rise´ theory by Zheng Bijian has changed to `Peace and Development´. The debate between the different factions in relation to the `Peaceful Rise´ is captured in Leonard´s book, giving one window of the lively debate that goes on in Chinese foreign policy. The entire narrational background of the debate is too long to be covered here, but the quote below will suffice to provide that window into this debate which perhaps faintly reflects the larger structural framework of Chinese foreign policy debate:
`...although the term(Peaceful Rise) has lost its official endorsement, the remarkable debate which the phrase provoked continues to rage. The liberal internationalists, who want China to join the Western world and fight for its rights within the system, are continuing to struggle with the neo-comms whose long-term goal is to build an alternative system with China at its centre. And in the middle are the pragmatists who will support any idea that advances China´s interests. All three camps are mixing Western theories with traditional Chinese thinking to advance their cause (92).”
A New Chinese Modernity
China is taking Western ideas and creating its own models. The challenge, according to Gan Yang, a political scientist of the `New Left´, is to create a new idea of modernity that is based on Chinese historical experiences. He explains the current Chinese context as the confluence of three powerful traditions: 1) that of the central market and the tradition strengthened during the years of the reform era (including the concepts of freedom and rights), 2) the tradition formed under the rule of Mao Zedong(including the concepts of equality and justice), and 3) the Confucian tradition shaped during the thousands of years of Chinese civilization. Contrary to past understanding, these traditions are not in conflict with one another.
It is clear that the Chinese adapt Western ideas to the Chinese context, as Sun Yat-sen did in the early twentieth century when he designed the Three Principles of the People, a comprehensive socio-economic modernisation program for China at the time.
It is liberating to think that, indeed, a new idea of Chinese modernity can include elements from all three traditions spoken of above. This is initially a liberating thought because the Confucian tradition includes a critique of the extremities of market reforms taken under Deng´s glorification of materialism. Sun´s historical Three Principles dis not advocate profit-seeking either, and
in essence the modernisation program drew from early British social-democracy. It would be intriguing to reflect the significance of his ideas with the current ideas on Chinese modernity and modernisation by current Chinese `New Left´ thinkers.
National Sovereignty and Multilateralism
If the nature of current Chinese modernity and modernisation is one key theme for the reader to follow in its reflection of what the Chinese domestic world is like, then a key theme to follow in relation to Chinese foreign policy is Chinese involvement in multilateral institutions.
China attaches a different meaning to the concept of multilateralism: Instead of pooling sovereignty, like the West seeks to do, for China it means securing sovereignty. Both the European Union and NATO, for example, are `defined by an approach that includes the pooling rather than the protecting of sovereignty´ . These, according to Leonard `have found their matches in the Chinese inspired East Asian Community and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Through these organizations, China is reassuring its neighbours of its peaceful intent and creating a new community of interest that excludes the USA.´
Conclusion
The concept of national sovereignty dominates the estimated future course of China also. Leonard calls this the ‘Great Wall mentality’. According to Leonard, China does not have a `pre-calculated master-plan´, but it is continually experimenting with new ways to do things. It is in fact testing `a thousand ideas´; China, to my mind, is one big experiment whose strength is in the dualistic ability to both innovate and conform, simultaneously.
Yet, the question of democracy remains. Can the Chinese experiment be supported by another country, for example by Finland, in such a way as to avoid a scenario where Chinese neo-liberal capitalism is maintained in such a way as to cause repression and aggressive environmental damage? The discussions, as pictured in this 2008 written book, are encouraging in this respect. China is not one huge mindless capitalistic machine, after all. There are inner domestic debates, and in fact, according to Leonard, “the Chinese government is, in some ways, its own sternest critic.”
Yes, authoritarian regimes can deliver economic growth. Yes, China is such an authoritarian project. But, as evidenced in the arguments of the Chinese `New Left´ documented in Leonard´s book, and as these arguments are taken a bit further: Chinese economic growth, which translates to global economic growth, is attached to the challenge of how to get the Chinese to “spend more and save less”. This is confirmed by mainstream economists in the West, as well. If, according to the Chinese `New Left´thinkers, for this to happen it is for the Chinese government to take action and provide more of a social security net for the citizens, to build a welfare society where the citizen would feel safe enough to spend-that is, advance social-democracy- then a window of opportunity certainly opens up for increased Finnish support of China in the area of sharing experiences on building a welfare state. According to Leonard, the building of a welfare state is something which the Chinese government has been committed to, at least in form, but isn´t it form, that provides for the creation of substance- when seen from the Chinese perspective?
Although China naturally applies models into its own experience, it is constantly testing and innovating. When this Chinese innovation and comprehensive thinking ability is combined with Finnish partnership, this will surely not leave either partner cold in matters of democracy and innovation of social safety net- structures. For the Finnish, valuable lessons can be learned from Chinese comprehensive thinking style and innovative thinking for its current structural reforming needs; and for the Chinese, the question of democracy-defined here largely as equality-is innate the question of building a welfare system. These developments create a continuum for dialogue, especially in Finnish-Chinese think tank exchange. The influence of the capitalistic machine can be complemented with a more humane touch, in both countries.
In conclusion, in a situation where national sovereignty is increasingly being pooled in Europe, Chinese diplomacy is multilateral in form, but its substance is concerned with advancing national interest. Analysis of the nature of Chinese modernisation and modernity will naturally provide knowledge as to what the “Walled World” of the Chinese is like.
Therefore, in the context of reflecting on the challenges of current Chinese modernisation through the lens of a historical Chinese modernisation program which drew from an early form of British Democracy (Dr. Sun Yat-sen´s The Three Principles of the People) this review will close in support of a more recent modernisation program: Charter 08. The 2008 published Charter 08 has reviewed the political modernisation process of the past one hundred years or so, and is highly critical of the current government´s approach to modernisation. The Charter represents a key voice of Chinese society, a voice that is, in fact, being silenced. This review will close in support of this voice and the nineteen recommendations it presents on national governance, citizens´rights, and social development. These recommendations are: a new constitution, seperation of powers, legislative democracy, independent judiciary, public control of public servants, guarantee of human rights, election of public officials, rural-urban equality, freedom to form groups, freedom to assemble, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, civic education, protection of private property, financial and tax reform, social security, protection of the environment, a federated republic, and truth in reconciliation,(for the full translated Charter, please see http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22210).
Päivi Kuusela/e2
This article concludes the China series of the 2009 autumn internship
China Market Intelligence
This article is adapted from a report that first appeared in China Market Intelligence, the US-China Business Council's (USCBC) members-only newsletter. For more information, please see http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/
I think this is an excellent overview providing up-to-date information on Chinese think tanks, future challenges and current operating context.
Päivi Kuusela
The Role of China's Think Tanks in Policymaking
Unlike most Western think tanks, most Chinese think tanks are in some way affiliated with the government, which largely dictates their function and work. They range from government-funded policy research institutes to fully independent think tanks that receive no government funding. The majority, however, lie in between, supported by and working for the government but not considered government agencies. In 2008, China had roughly 2,500 policy research institutes, which employed about 35,000 researchers mostly drawn from the ranks of leading PRC academics and retired government officials, according to Xinhua News Agency. Western analysts—such as James McGann, director of the Think Tanks and Civil Society Program at the University of Pennsylvania—identify approximately 70 leading central-level think tanks comparable to think tanks elsewhere, with varying levels of influence on the policymaking process.
Most Chinese think tanks research economic and international relations issues, but a few engage in sensitive domestic political and military issues. Many groups distill international policy and experience into an applicable domestic policy package for government agencies to incorporate into their policymaking. Some think tanks have helped to identify politically sensitive issues that require attention from the authorities, such as rural social disturbances, and to get them on the policy agenda.
Government policy research institutes
Many key government bodies have established policy research institutes to research and draft policies for their parent agencies to ratify and implement. Some are extremely influential in establishing policy in their fields. Key government policy research institutes include
The Central Party School (CPS) CPS is the top education center of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and is responsible for training government officials at the county level and above in political theory, governance, and leadership.
State Council Development Research Center (DRC) The DRC conducts policy research on economic and social issues and provides policy frameworks, including long-term development plans.
Ministerial policy institutes. Many ministries maintain entities to research and provide draft policies.
Official think tanks
These institutions report directly to government agencies or are housed within government-directed universities and conduct research for policymakers. This group constitutes the majority of China's think tanks. Leading examples include
China Academy of Sciences (CAS) CAS is China's top center for science and technology research and related policy research and development. Founded in 1949 and reporting directly to the State Council, CAS now has nearly 37,000 technical staff, including more than 1,000 PhD-level researchers.
China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) CASS also reports to the State Council and includes 31 separate research institutes with more than 3,000 researchers. CASS provides input on a broad range of policy issues. Though not generally considered think tanks, China's state-owned enterprises also influence policy in sectors in which they have a strong presence.
"Semi-official" think tanks
- China Center for International Economic Exchange (CCIEE) This body, headed by former PRC Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan and established in March 2009, is tasked with examining the current global economic crisis and providing support to key government decisionmakers in crafting response policies.
Independent think tanks
A small group of entirely independent think tanks derive their funding from domestic commercial sources or international institutional and commercial sources, which shape their research work. Prominent independent think tanks include the Unirule Group, founded in 1993. As they are not associated with government agencies, these organizations can be the most critical of government policy.
Future trends
More think tanks have been established in the last decade than any previous period in PRC history, and the recent founding of the CCIEE indicates high-level government support for semi-official think tanks. It also suggests think tanks may continue to proliferate and gain influence as China's policymaking becomes more sophisticated, and that other specialized groups could be established to tackle high-profile policy issues.
