The Major Emitters, Positions for Copenhagen-seminar
The “Major Emitters - Positions for Copenhagen” seminar was held in Helsinki on 1 December of this year. Below is an excerpt from the official seminar summary, which highlights the positions of China and the United States.
The full summary of the seminar and the publication published alongside the seminar entitled ‘Towards a new climate regime?The key players gearing up for Copenhagen’ can be found at
In the final presentation the positions of the United States and China were delivered by Mr. Hans Verolme, a senior strategic climate adviser with over a decade of policy-related experience in both the US and Europe. Mr Verolme opened up by discussing the global realities of climate change, presenting views of the world from per capita, annual and historical emissions perspectives, before moving onto the core issues for Copenhagen. These core issues were set out as two pillars: environmental integrity, guided by the best available science, and equity. Considering the environmental side, an outcome compatible with limiting warming to “well below 2 degrees” Celsius is the target – “if you can’t change the science, change the politics” was the message. Vital to this is how much can and will the United States commit to, and at the same time, preventing the undermining of a deal through loopholes such as ‘hot air’ and non-additionality. Essentially, emissions have to peak and begin to decline within the next decade. Equity, the second pillar, had been at the heart of negotiations and agreements from the beginning of the climate change talks. Based on the tenets of ‘Common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR), securing equity in climate agreements relates to the new levels of financing for mitigation of and adaptation to climate change to be decided, with the addition of technology transfer. Considering all of the above, Mr Verolme raised the question of whether no deal would be better than a bad deal at Copenhagen. Beyond this background, the presentation moved on to China. The position outlined was that China is to make a ‘binding’ commitment on carbon intensity, which would not be contingent on international support and to be measured, verified and reported nationally. This commitment is to reduce emissions intensity per unit GDP by 40-45% below 2005 levels by 2020. This is consistent with the IEA’s scenario of 450ppm carbon dioxide. In attaining this goal, the Communist Party has a strong-self interest. Alongside this, a renewables target for 2020 is set at 15% of energy production. Moving onto the case of the USA, the Obama administration is also ready to enter into a binding agreement, also with national MRVing. The pledge is to cut emissions by 17-20% from 2005 levels by 2020. This would only amount to a relatively meagre -4% below 1990 levels (the baseline used by most countries for pledges) and is not consistent with the 450ppm IEA scenario. The US also has the target of 15% renewable energy by 2020. Problems it will have to face in reaching these goals and in negotiations are weak car efficiency, trade measures, IPR and finance. In conclusion, Hans Verolme expressed his doubts that Copenhagen can deliver a deal that would be compatible with what the current science dictates necessary to limit warming to 2 degrees or below. Other concerns were the asymmetry of the negotiations and the problem of securing comparability of US action whilst at the same time not jeopardising Senate ratification of the deal.
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The full summary of the seminar and the publication published alongside the seminar entitled ‘Towards a new climate regime?The key players gearing up for Copenhagen’ can be found at
http://www.upi-fiia.fi/fi/event/246/.
The excerpt from the seminar summary can be found below:
In the final presentation the positions of the United States and China were delivered by Mr. Hans Verolme, a senior strategic climate adviser with over a decade of policy-related experience in both the US and Europe. Mr Verolme opened up by discussing the global realities of climate change, presenting views of the world from per capita, annual and historical emissions perspectives, before moving onto the core issues for Copenhagen. These core issues were set out as two pillars: environmental integrity, guided by the best available science, and equity. Considering the environmental side, an outcome compatible with limiting warming to “well below 2 degrees” Celsius is the target – “if you can’t change the science, change the politics” was the message. Vital to this is how much can and will the United States commit to, and at the same time, preventing the undermining of a deal through loopholes such as ‘hot air’ and non-additionality. Essentially, emissions have to peak and begin to decline within the next decade. Equity, the second pillar, had been at the heart of negotiations and agreements from the beginning of the climate change talks. Based on the tenets of ‘Common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR), securing equity in climate agreements relates to the new levels of financing for mitigation of and adaptation to climate change to be decided, with the addition of technology transfer. Considering all of the above, Mr Verolme raised the question of whether no deal would be better than a bad deal at Copenhagen. Beyond this background, the presentation moved on to China. The position outlined was that China is to make a ‘binding’ commitment on carbon intensity, which would not be contingent on international support and to be measured, verified and reported nationally. This commitment is to reduce emissions intensity per unit GDP by 40-45% below 2005 levels by 2020. This is consistent with the IEA’s scenario of 450ppm carbon dioxide. In attaining this goal, the Communist Party has a strong-self interest. Alongside this, a renewables target for 2020 is set at 15% of energy production. Moving onto the case of the USA, the Obama administration is also ready to enter into a binding agreement, also with national MRVing. The pledge is to cut emissions by 17-20% from 2005 levels by 2020. This would only amount to a relatively meagre -4% below 1990 levels (the baseline used by most countries for pledges) and is not consistent with the 450ppm IEA scenario. The US also has the target of 15% renewable energy by 2020. Problems it will have to face in reaching these goals and in negotiations are weak car efficiency, trade measures, IPR and finance. In conclusion, Hans Verolme expressed his doubts that Copenhagen can deliver a deal that would be compatible with what the current science dictates necessary to limit warming to 2 degrees or below. Other concerns were the asymmetry of the negotiations and the problem of securing comparability of US action whilst at the same time not jeopardising Senate ratification of the deal.